Our Perspectives on Sapporo's February 28, 2025 Presentation

March 5th, 2025



Observations on the Audit and Supervisory Committee	3
Observations on the Independence of Outside Director Mr. Makio Tanehashi	8
Observations on the Real Estate Divestment Process	11
Observations on Sapporo's Response to 3D's Shareholder Proposal	18
Observations on Sapporo's Response to 3D's Public Inquiry	26
Disclaimer	35


Observations on the Audit and Supervisory Committee

Sapporo has not sufficiently responded to the issues raised by 3D regarding the lack of

independence and expertise of the Audit and Supervisory Committee

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)

The Audit and Supervisory Committee has a majority of independent outside directors, enabling it to closely monitor the execution of duties and fulfill its supervisory function appropriately.



- Composition of the Audit and Supervisory Committee
- The Audit and Supervisory Committee is composed of a majority of independent outside directors.

Chairperson: Internal Director: Chairperson, Director Miyaishi, has experience in corporate planning, human resources, and marketing in the alcoholic beverages and food & beverage businesses. He possesses skills in corporate management, human resources & talent development, marketing, DX, and IT.

Independent Outside Director: Director Yamamoto, as a lawyer, possesses skills in legal affairs, compliance, risk management, global business, and sustainability.

Independent Outside Director: Director Tanouchi has experience in M&A, corporate planning, and auditing in a major food business. She possesses skills in financial accounting, legal affairs, compliance, risk management, global business, and marketing.

- Number of Audit and Supervisory Committee Meetings Held: 17
- 2) Hearings and Exchanges of Opinions on Business Reports from Directors, etc. : Directors: 30 times, Group Executive Officers: 13 times
- 3) Investigation of Group Companies' Performance and Financial Status, and Exchanges of Opinions: Exchanges of Opinions with Key Department Heads, On-site Inspections (Domestic Business Sites, North American Alcohol Subsidiaries, Asian Food & Beverage Subsidiaries, etc.)
- 4) Communication with Financial Auditors, Internal Audit, and Internal Control Departments: 53 times
- 5) Others: Attendance at important meetings, Exchange of opinions with company auditors of business companies and subsidiaries

lssue 1

- Our Observation: Mr. Miyaishi, who lacks independence, serves as the Chairperson of the Audit and Supervisory Committee.
- Sapporo's Response / Our View: Sapporo only provides a formalistic explanation that the majority of the Audit and Supervisory Committee consists of independent outside directors.

Issue 2

- Our Observation: The Audit and Supervisory Committee lacks the necessary expertise to make critical future decisions regarding (1) maximizing the value of the proceeds from the real estate divestiture and (2) allocating those proceeds optimally.
- Sapporo's Response / Our View:
 - Sapporo touts the expertise of the Committee members, but there is no member with the necessary expertise in business and asset divestiture processes, real estate, or capital allocation—critical areas for key future decisions.
 - Regarding Ms. Tanouchi's "M&A" skills, our understanding is that she does not have experience in large-scale M&A transactions of the multihundred-billion-yen scale that Sapporo envisions.

Issue 3

- Our Observation: There are deficiencies in both independence and expertise, raising doubts about whether appropriate audits can be conducted for critical decisions in the future.
- Sapporo's Response / Our View: Sapporo only discloses formal figures such as the number of Audit and Supervisory Committee meetings held and the frequency of business reports collected. This makes it impossible to determine the Committee's effectiveness.

Source: February 28, 2025「株主提案に対する当社取締役会意見並びに当社ガバナンス体制に関する補足説明(及び株主の質問状に対する当社見解)」 Note: 3D understand that no English version of the materials has been disclosed as of March 4th, 2025 (For reference) We have pointed out deficiencies in the Audit and Supervisory Committee from the perspectives of independence and expertise (1/3): The Audit and Supervisory Committee lacks the necessary independence for auditing, as its chairperson is an internal personnel

Our Materials (February 25, 2025)

The Audit and Supervisory Committee's independence is an extremely important factor

 The Corporate Governance Code places significant importance on the independence of company auditors and the board of company auditors, and this is similarly interpreted to apply to the Audit and Supervisory Committee


"Kansayaku and the kansayaku board should bear in mind their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders and make decisions from an independent and objective standpoint when executing their roles and responsibilities including the audit of the performance of directors' duties, appointment and dismissal of kansayaku and external auditors, and the determination of auditor remuneration." Corporate Governance Code Principle 4-4

 It is especially required that the chairperson of the Audit and Supervisory Committee maintain a high degree of independence

"I believe it is necessary to consider why independence is required. For example, it is generally agreed that a director serving as the chairperson of the Audit and Supervisory Committee should possess a high level of independence." Professor Takahito Kato, University of Tokyo

- In companies where serious past scandals have occurred, internal personnel have served as the chairpersons of the audit committee
 - For example, at Toshiba, the former head of the finance department, who was involved in fraudulent accounting, served as the chairperson of the audit committee

However, the chairpersons of The Audit and Supervisory Committee in the past have been internal personnel, raising concerns about their independence



Source : Company IR Materials; Inoue Taku et al., "Panel Discussion: Aiming for New Dialogue Between Listed Companies and Institutional Investors for Enhancing Corporate Value [Part 1] (The New Era of Shareholder Relations (SR) – Questioning the Meaning of 'Dialogue')" (Tokyo Stock Exchange and Tokyo Stockholders' Association Public Symposium), Shunkan Shōji Hōmu, Issue 2371, p.31 (2024) [Professor Kato's Statement]; Tokyo Stock Exchange "Corporate Governance Code"

(For reference) We have pointed out deficiencies in the Audit and Supervisory Committee from the perspectives of independence and expertise (2/3): The expertise required for accounting and business audits is as follows

		The expertise required for accounting and business audits	
Accounti ng Audit		 It is essential to have expertise to verify the accuracy and legality of accounting documents and to ensure the reliability of financial reports. It is also necessary to contribute to strengthening corporate governance by auditing the appropriateness of shareholder meeting proposals related to accounting. 	Accounting
		(1) Maximizing the proceeds from the divestiture of the real estate business	Real Estate
Business Audit	Irrevers ible	 In order to maximize the proceeds from the real estate divestiture, it is essential to have a deep understanding of the real estate itself In addition, advanced expertise in designing the optimal business and asset divestiture process is also necessary 	Business and Asset Divestiture Process
	issues Sappor o is facing	 ② Optimal allocation of the proceeds from the divestiture The options for reinvesting the proceeds of the divestiture are assumed to be special dividends, share buybacks, M&A, and capital investment, and in particular, M&A requires a high level of expertise 	M&A
		 In selecting the reinvestment option, a decision is required to maximize corporate value by comparing the options, and deep expertise in each policy and the ability to accurately assess financial and strategic impacts are required 	Capital Allocation Policy

(For reference) We have pointed out deficiencies in the Audit and Supervisory Committee from the perspectives of independence and expertise (3/3): The Committee members appear to lack the necessary expertise

					Our Materials (February 25, 2025)
			Mr. Miyaishi	Mr. Yamamoto	Ms. Tanouchi
Accounting Audit		Accounting	 His background is primarily in sales, human resources, and corporate strategy, and he lacks a certified public accountant qualification 	 Has spent his career as a lawyer, with no experience in practical finance or management accounting 	 Has an audit background, but no experience in finance or management accounting
		Real Estate	 No direct involvement in key real estate practices, such as acquisition, development, management or sale 	 No direct involvement in real estate acquisition, development, management or sale 	 No direct involvement in real estate acquisition, development, management or sale
Business	Irreversi ble	Business and Asset Divestiture Process	 Some experience in management strategy, but no experience large- scale selling businesses or assets 	 No experience selling businesses or assets as an executive 	 Some experience in corporate planning, but no experience selling businesses or assets on the scale of hundreds of billions of yen
Audit	issues Sapporo is facing	M&A	 Served as a director and executive officer at Sapporo Breweries at the time of the failed Stone acquisition 	 No experience leading M&A processes as an executive 	 Some experience in M&A, but not on the scale of hundreds of billions of yen
		Capital Allocation Policy	 Has never served in a role overseeing capital allocation or capital allocation policy 	 Has never served in a role overseeing capital allocation or capital allocation policy 	 Has never served in a role overseeing capital allocation or capital allocation policy

Observations on the Independence of Outside Director Mr. Makio Tanehashi

Sapporo states that Mr. Tanehashi meets formal independence criteria, but it does not address the substantive independence concerns that we have raised

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)

庄司 哲也		DX推進に関する高い見識を有し	実績を有し、特に企画・人事総務・グローバル展開・	賛成率	<u>立性基準を満たしており</u> 、ま		
		開、DXでの業務改革等での的確	ております。事業ポートフォリオの整理、グローバル展 な提言・助言を期待しております。	98.75%	た、金融商品取引所が定める 独立性基準を満たしているた め、東京証券取引所及び札幌		
内山 俊弘	0		実績を有し、特にグローバル展開・コンプライアン 、見識を有しております。グローバル展開、マーケティ 特しております。	99.69%	80、東京証券取引所及び1000 証券取引所に対して、独立役 員として届け出ております。		
種橋 牧夫	0	関する高い見識を有しておりま	、実績を有し、不動産事業・財務・コンプライアンスに す。不動産事業での資産効率向上において、金融、不動 的確な提言・助言を期待しております。	99.48%	※当社 社外取締役独立性基準 (一部抜粋)		
岡村 宏太郎	0	ル展開・人事人財に関する高い	な業務、経営の経験、実績を有し、財務会計・グローバ 見識を有しております。資本効率の向上、グローバルM 窪な提言・助言を期待しております。	99.74%	主要取引先(年間連結売上収 益の2%以上の支払)、主要 株主(総議決権の10%以上を		
泰井 良太郎	0	展開・マーケティングに関する	ドでの豊富な経験、実績を有し、財務会計・グローバル 高い見識を有しております。資本効率の向上、構造改革 策定・推進にて的確な提言・ो言を期待しております。	99.74%	保有)等に <u>現在又は過去3年</u> <u>間に該当</u> していない者		
山本 光太郎	0		等を専門分野とし、企業法務分野に精通した弁護士とし 、職務の執行を監査・監督いただけるものと期待してお	99.71%	N N		
田内 直子 🌘	0	し、経営企画、内部監査、監査	と回、内部監査、監査役等の豊富な経験・実績・見識を有 役、社外取締役におけるこれまでの経験に基づき、取締 ただけるものと期待しております。	99.81%			

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Our Observations:

- Outside directors who represent and advocate for shareholders are required to have substantive independence, not just formal independence.
- We do not believe Mr. Tanehashi is substantively independent.
 - ✓ He is currently serving as a director of Tokyo Tatemono, a Fuyo Group company engaged in cross-shareholding, and was appointed as an outside director of Sapporo at the time when Sapporo's executive management announced a policy to increase investment in real estate business.
 - He previously served as Deputy President of Mizuho Bank, Sapporo's main bank.
- Sapporo's Response / Our View:
 - Sapporo merely affirms that Mr. Tanehashi formally meets both the Company's and the Tokyo Stock Exchange's independence criteria.
 - Sapporo has failed to address the substantive independence issues concerning Mr. Tanehashi that we have highlighted.

(For Reference) We have disclosed our concern that Mr. Tanehashi is not substantively independent

After the Mid-Term Management Plan was announced, Mr. Tanehashi was appointed as an outside director from Tokyo Tatemono to support Sapporo's real estate investment strategy



" Mr. Makio Tanehashi has a wealth of experience and a rich track record as a corporate manager as well as extensive insight for real estate business, finance and compliance. For the achievement of the Medium-Term Management Plan (2023 to 2026), Mr. Tanehashi is expected to offer pertinent opinions and advice regarding the important issues of creation of multilayered structure to gain profit and improvement of asset efficiency in the real estate business based on his abundant management experience in finance and real estate, and from his objective and professional standpoint. [Omitted]"

Notice of Convocation for the 99th Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders

Our Materials (February 25, 2025)

However, we have serious concerns regarding Mr. Tanehashi's independence

- There are Deep Connections Between Tokyo Tatemono and Sapporo
 - Cross-shareholding exists between Tokyo Tatemono and Sapporo

Sapporo HD Securities Report	東京建物㈱	115, 878 245		取引関係の維持・強化並びに営業協力関 係の構築・推進のため	有
Tokyo Tatemono	サッポロホールディ	111,980	111,980	ビル事業における不動産取引等を維持・	
Securities Report	ングス株	696	367	強化して企業価値向上に資するため。	月

- Both companies are part of the Fuyo Group
 - ✓ The Fuyo Group is a corporate conglomerate consisting of companies with historical ties to the Yasuda, Asano, and Okura zaibatsu, as well as those affiliated with the Fuji Bank (now Mizuho Bank) financing network
 - ✓ The Fuyo Group continues to operate as the "Fuyo Council," with both Tokyo Tatemono and Sapporo as members
- Mizuho Bank, where Mr. Tanehashi served as Deputy President, is Sapporo's primary bank
 - As of December 2023, Sapporo's largest lender was Mizuho Bank, with outstanding loans of ¥9.0 billion
 - Additionally, Mizuho Bank and Sapporo engage in cross-shareholding


	(㈱みずほフィナンシ ャルグループ	91, 432 221	91, 432 170	取引関係の維持・強化並びに営業協力関 係の構築・推進のため	有
Securities Report	, 			• • • • • •	
	サッポロホール	1, 106, 584	*	発行会社との金融分野を中心とした総合的	的有
Mizuho FG	ティングス株式会社		*	な取引関係を維持強化するため。	11
Securities Report					

Source: 2024 Fiscal Year Q2 Financial Results Presentation Script; Nikkei December 20, 2024; Group Medium- to Long-Term Growth Strategy February 14, 2025

Observations on the Real Estate Divestment Process

Sapporo, despite our specific concerns, continues to reject making a direct commitment to maximizing the value of the proceeds from the divestiture of its real estate business

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)



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Our Observations


 Committing to maximize the value of the proceeds from the divestiture of the real estate business, which accounts for over 70% of the Company's market capitalization, is a prerequisite for an effective process to maximize corporate value and should not be controversial

Sapporo's Response / Our View

- Despite our repeated requests that the Board make a simple commitment to maximize value, the Company continues to use vague language, such as "increasing group's corporate value" and "increasing the value of owned properties and enhancing corporate value"
- Sapporo continues to refuse to explicitly commit to maximizing the value of the proceeds from the divestiture of the real estate business

Sapporo, despite our specific concerns, continues to reject even an interim report on the real estate business divestment scheme, which is a fundamental level of transparency that should naturally be ensured for shareholders

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)



We believe that Sapporo's response, claiming that pre-disclosure of the real estate business divestment scheme would hinder sincere proposals and reviews by potential buyers, is unreasonable

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)

Sapporo's Response: We believe that disclosing information that has not been agreed upon or finalized through discussions with potential partners at an intermediate stage of this process could hinder sincere proposals and reviews by potential partners and may prevent us from achieving the best possible outcome for enhancing our corporate value


Our View

- We are requesting the pre-disclosure of the real estate business divestment scheme to shareholders
- Sapporo unjustifiably claims that pre-disclosure of the real estate business divestment scheme would hinder sincere proposals and reviews by potential buyers, but in reality, the opposite is true
 - Disclosure contributes to fostering confidence in the feasibility of the transaction and reassurance that there is no risk of changes to the scheme
 - Potential buyers will find it easier to commit resources to prepare proposals, and a mindset that maximizing price is essential to winning the competition will be cultivated
 - As a result, pre-disclosure of the scheme actually promotes serious proposals and reviews by potential buyers
- The appropriate process should be: (1) finalizing the scheme, (2) ensuring a sufficient competitive environment under the same conditions, and (3) selecting the best proposal based on quantitative price comparisons. However, Sapporo's response raises **concerns about deviations from this appropriate process**



We are deeply concerned that the lack of a public commitment to disclose the real estate business divestment scheme may lead potential buyers to perceive uncertainty regarding the project and the scheme, thereby reducing their allocation of resources to proposals or even withdrawing from the bidding process altogether

(For Reference) We believe that, in order to maximize Sapporo's corporate value, the following are essential: (1) a commitment to maximizing the proceeds from the divestiture of its real estate business, (2) the selection of an appropriate method, and (3) transparent disclosure to shareholders



(For Reference) We have pointed out that Sapporo's failure to commit to maximizing the proceeds from the divestiture of its real estate business is unreasonable from the perspective of maximizing corporate value

Sapporo's disclosures regarding the real estate divestiture lack a firm commitment to maximizing the proceed


Our Materials (February 25, 2025)


"Next, with regard to the real estate business, from the perspective of increasing the value of the Group with an eye on the growth of alcoholic beverages, we are studying how to utilize this business and how to fundamentally reform our business portfolio, with experts also involved. Specifically, we are now extensively considering all options, including the introduction of external capital into Sapporo Real Estate Development Co., Ltd., the sale of individual properties, and the tax-qualified spin-offs proposed by our shareholders. We would like to refine our considerations and seek specific proposals from a wide range of potential strategic partners to increase the value of our real estate business. By considering these proposals, we would like to clarify the options that will contribute the most to increasing the value of the Group."

2024 Fiscal Year Q2 Financial Results Presentation

Mr. Oga explained that for the bidding, he requested proposals for the entire business, rather than for individual properties, with the aim of "maximizing the group's corporate value."

Nikkei December 20, 2024. (Translated)





(For Reference) We have pointed out that Sapporo should pre-disclose the real estate business divestment scheme to ensure transparency for shareholders and establish a fair competitive environment among potential buyers

The appropriate process for the divestiture of the real estate business

(1) Publish an interim report on the real estate divestiture scheme

- Based on the proposals received after September 2024, finalize a specific real estate divestiture scheme, including the following:
 - ①Real estate to be divested
 - 2Plan of divestiture
 - ③Stake to be divested
 - ④Timing of divestiture
- Provide a detailed explanation to shareholders in the interim report, justifying why this scheme is expected to maximize corporate value

(2) Publish the final report on the buyer and the transfer price

- If the sale of individual properties or the divestiture of a business entity is selected, the final buyer and transfer price should be determined after soliciting proposals again following the interim report
- The final report to shareholders should include a detailed explanation of why the transfer price is considered to be the maximum, along with the disclosure of the final plan, buyer, and transfer price

The benefits of this process

(1)Ensuring transparency to shareholders

 By conducting interim and final reports, shareholders will be able to fully understand the progress and final decision-making details of the real estate divestiture

(2)Maximizing the transfer price by establishing a proper and fair competitive bidding process among potential buyers of the real estate

- Establishment of a proper and fair competitive bidding process
- If an interim report is provided, potential buyers will be able to confirm a sufficient commitment to the real estate divestiture, thus alleviating concerns about the risk of the transaction being canceled

Our Materials (February 25, 2025)

- As a result, the allocation of resources for proposal evaluation will be strengthened, leading to higher-quality proposals
- Furthermore, demonstrating commitment will alleviate concerns that potential buyers may focus more on aspects such as the transaction scheme rather than the price itself

Maximization of the sale price By establishing a proper and fair competitive bidding process, competition among potential buyers will be focused on maximizing the price, leading to an expected increase in the transfer price

Observations on Sapporo's Response to 3D's Shareholder Proposal

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)

	Sapporo's Cla
3 エグゼクティブ・サマリー	SAPPORO
本株主提案では、提案株主の当社に対する「資本規律への疑義」「取締役会の監督機能への疑義」「取締役会の専 義」「取締役会の透明性への疑義」の4 つの疑義から、(i) Paul J. Brough氏を監査等委員である取締役として選 (ii) (i) が承認可決されない場合にPaul J. Brough氏を監査等委員でない取締役として選任すること、を求めて	Etazzk. 1) Effer
しかしながら、 <u>提案株主が述べる疑義の根拠となる諸事項について、当社の現体制には当たらない</u> と考えます。 当社取締役会としては、当社が目指す中長期的な企業価値向上並びに株主の皆様の利益のためには、現在の取締役(考えており、本株主提案に <mark>反対</mark> いたします。	^{k制が最適と} <i>2) Unde</i> <i>Has Ap</i> <i>Corpor</i>
当社取締役会が本株主提案に反対する理由は、以下の4点です。	
 ①当社のコーポレート・ガバナンス体制の強化への取り組み ②強化されたコーポレート・ガバナンス体制の下で、企業価値向上のため諸施策の策定及び執行を適切に実行して ③現在の提案する取締役体制が最適であること ④株主提案の候補者のスキルセットや資質・経験等を踏まえ、Paul J. Brough氏を追加で取締役とすべきとは考え 	
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candidate, Mr. Paul J. Brough should not be additionally appointed as a director

Source: February 28, 2025「株主提案に対する当社取締役会意見並びに当社ガバナンス体制に関する補足説明(及び株主の質問状に対する当社見解)」 Note: 3D understand that no English version of the materials has been disclosed as of March 4th, 2025

to Strengthen our Corporate Governance Structure

the Strengthened Corporate Governance Structure, the Company opriately Formulated and Executed Various Measures to Enhance Value

rrently Proposed Board Structure Is Optimal

ering the skill set, qualifications, and experience of the shareholder candidate, Mr. Paul J. Brough should not be additionally appointed or

① Sapporo asserts that its efforts to strengthen its corporate governance structure are sufficient; however, the Board's claim is base solely on formal requirements and fails to address any initiatives related to the Audit and Supervisory Committee

1 株主提案には反対					SAPPO
当社取締役会は、本株主	提案に <mark>反対</mark> いたします。	,			3470
【反対の理由】					
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[Reasons for Opposition]

<u>1)Our efforts to strengthen the corporate governance structure are sufficient:</u>

a. Independent outside directors make up the majority (7 out of 11 members).

b. The Nomination and Compensation Committees also consist of a majority of independent outside directors, ensuring independence, objectivity, and transparency.

c. We actively engage in dialogue with the capital markets. Independent outside directors also participate in these discussions, incorporating their opinions into management decisions.

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- Our Observations
 - Sapporo lacks discipline in capital management and commitment to shareholders, which creates a risk that the Company could (1) fail to maximize the value of proceeds of divestiture of the real estate business and (2) misallocate the proceeds, both of which could irreversibly impact corporate value
 - To minimize this risk, Mr. Paul Brough should be appointed as a director who is a member of Audit and Supervisory Committee to strengthen the oversight of the Board of Directors and the Audit and Supervisory Committee

Sapporo's Response

 Sapporo claims that the number of outside directors is sufficient and that it engages in dialogue with capital markets, arguing—based solely on formal criteria—that their efforts to strengthen the corporate governance structure are sufficient

• Our View

- Our proposal aims to create an effective governance structure that is necessary and adequate to maximize corporate value, not one that merely complies with formal criteria. Sapporo's declaration that its governance structure is sufficient based only on formal standards is unreasonable
- Sapporo has provided no assurance that the Audit and Supervisory Committee's oversight is effective

② Sapporo claims to have appropriately formulated and executed measures to enhance corporate value; however, Sapporo has misdirected the discussion and made claims that contradict the facts

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)

1 株主提案には反対	SAPPOR
当社取締役会は、本株主提案に <mark>反対</mark> いたします。	
【反対の理由】	
①当社のコーポレート・ガバナンス体制の強化への取組みが十分であること	
a.独立社外取締役が過半数(全11名中7名)	
b.指名委員会・報酬委員会も独立社外取締役が過半数、独立性・客観性・透明性がある体制	
c.資本市場との対話を積極的に展開。対話には独立社外取締役も参加し、経営にその意見を取り入	れている
2強化されたコーボレート・ガバナンス体制の下で、企業価値向上のための諸施策の策定および執行 たこと	を適切に実行してき
a.収益力強化と資本効率向上を目標とし取り組みを実施(事業ボートフォリオの見直し、政策保有	株式縮減の加速等)
b.中長期経営方針の策定、具体化検討のワーキンググループに独立社外取締役も参加、監督	
c.不動産事業への外部資本導入プロセスに関する詳細な情報開示は企業価値向上を毀損する恐れが 形成や株主への適切な説明の視点で適宜適切に対応	あり、競争環境の
	海外M&Aに知見が

2) Under the Strengthened Corporate Governance Structure, the Company Has Appropriately Formulated and Executed Various Measures to Enhance Corporate Value

- a. Implemented initiatives aimed at strengthening profitability and improving capital efficiency, including reviewing the business portfolio and accelerating the reduction of policy shareholdings
- b. Formulated **medium- to long-term management policies**, with independent outside directors participating in and supervising the working groups conducting concrete discussions
- c. Claims that disclosing detailed information about the external capital introduction process for the real estate business could harm corporate value, and will handle the matter appropriately from the perspective of fostering a competitive environment and providing adequate explanations to shareholders
- In overseas operations, prioritized organizational and human resource development to establish a stable business foundation. Appointed three independent outside directors with expertise in overseas M&A to enhance governance structure

lssues

- Our Observations
 - —The establishment of Sapporo's Group Strategy Review Committee, the confirmation of the real estate divestment policy, and the expansion of divestment targets were only implemented due to our engagement
 - —Pre-disclosing the real estate business divestment scheme would **enhance transparency for shareholders and encourage interest and sincere proposals from potential buyers**
 - —Prior to this, Sapporo should naturally commit to maximizing the value of the proceeds from the divestiture of its real estate business


Sapporo's Response

- —Sapporo claims that its efforts to enhance corporate value are sufficient as if Sapporo had voluntarily carried out measures a. to d. as listed on the left.
- —Sapporo claims that detailed disclosure of the real estate business divestment process would harm corporate value
- Our View
 - —We do not believe that Sapporo would have formulated and executed these measures to enhance corporate value without our engagement
 - —Sapporo's continued refusal to commit to maximizing the value of proceeds from the divestiture of its real estate business is irrational
 - —We are requesting disclosure of the divestment scheme, yet the Company arbitrarily reframes this as a demand for "detailed" disclosure and unreasonably claim—without any valid explanation—that it would harm corporate value

③ Sapporo claims that the currently proposed Board structure is optimal; however, Sapporo has misdirected the discussion and avoided addressing the issues we have pointed out

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)

transparency



- lssues
- Our Observations
 - As Sapporo faces two critical decisions—(1) maximizing the value of the proceeds from divestiture of its real estate business and (2) optimaly allocating the divestment proceeds—it is essential to strengthen the function of the Audit and Supervisory Committee and enhance oversight in the appropriateness audits to prevent poor decision-making
 - The current Audit and Supervisory Committee Chairperson, Mr. Miyaishi, was directly involved in past M&A transactions that resulted in significant impairment losses. Furthermore, the Audit and Supervisory Committee members lack the necessary expertise to audit such important future decisions, leading to a deficiency in both independence and expertise within the committee
- Sapporo's Response
 - The Company argues that expertise in real estate, finance, M&A, and the food industry exists among directors who are NOT members of the Audit and Supervisory Committee, and therefore, the Board composition is optimal
 - The Company claims that the supervisory function is sufficient simply because the majority of the Board consists of outside directors, relying only on formal requirements
- Our View
 - The Company merely asserts that directors who are NOT members of the Audit and Supervisory Committee possess the required expertise, without addressing the lack of independence and expertise within the Audit and Supervisory Committee itself
 - Because ongoing governance failures stemming from inadequate capital discipline and insufficient commitment to shareholders can be observed, it is clear that Sapporo's statement, which relies solely on formal requirements, is mistaken

④-1 Sapporo claims that Mr. Paul Brough should not be appointed as a director based on his qualifications and experience; however, this claim minimizes and misrepresents Mr. Brough's substantial expertise

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)

3-2 株主提案には反対		
■ 当社取締役会は、本株主提案に <mark>反対</mark> いたします。		
【反対の理由】		
③現在の提案する取締役体制が最適であること		
a.2023年に不動産に知見がある種構取締役、2024年に金融 田内取締役を選任 b.取締役会は、そのうち過半数が独立社外取締役で構成さ ④株主提案の候補者のスキルセットや資質・経験等を踏ま いこと	れ、高い監督機能と透明性を兼ね備えた体制	
a. Paul J. Brough氏は、「財務会計」をコアスキルとして している	いるが、当社推薦の複数の取締役候補者とスキ	ルセットが重複
b. Paul J. Brough氏は、主要株主・筆頭株主である、 3 D		
Paul J. Brough氏と指名委員との間で面談を実施したと		いら報酬を得て
いるとのことであり、当社独立性基準では「非独立」と	なると判断。	
	Copyright, 2025 SAPPORO HOLDI	NGS LTD. All rights reserved. 21
* The red highlight added by 3D.		

a. Mr. Paul J. Brough's core skill is **"financial** accounting", but his skill set overlaps with multiple director candidates recommended by the company

lssues

Our Observations

- As the Company faces two critical decisions—(1) maximizing the value of the proceeds from divestiture of its real estate business and (2) optimaly allocating the divestment proceeds—the Audit and Supervisory Committee must have expertise in accounting, real estate, business and asset divestment processes, M&A, and capital allocation policies
- Paul Brough possesses extensive experience directly related to these areas, making him a suitable, well-qualified candidate for appointment as a director who is a member of the Audit and Supervisory Committee
- Sapporo's Response
 - The Company asserts that Mr. Paul Brough's core skill is limited to "financial accounting" and claims that his expertise overlaps with other director candidates
- Our View
 - Paul Brough's expertise is not limited to financial accounting alone. The Company's attempt to restrict his core skill to financial accounting is arbitrary and unreasonable
 - In addition to financial accounting expertise, Mr. Paul Brough is also an experienced public company outside director, a turnaround expert, and has served as an advisor and corporate director in many restructurings, strategic review processes, asset sales, acquisitions,take-private transactions and real estate businesses. We believe he has more experience in these areas than any of Sapporo's incumbent directors
 - Mr. Paul Brough is a Chartered Accountant (FCA) in the UK, a credentital that no other director candidate holds, which illustrates that Sapporo's claim that his skill set overlaps with other candidates is also arbitrary and irrational

④-2 Sapporo claims that Mr. Paul Brough should not be appointed as a director based on his qualifications and experience; however, these claims regarding Mr. Paul Brough's independence are arbitrary and unreasonable

3-2	株主提案には反対	
■ 当	社取締役会は、本株主提案に <mark>反対</mark> いたします。	SAPA
ľ	反対の理由】	
1	③現在の提案する取締役体制が最適であること	
	a.2023年に不動産に知見がある種植取締役、2024年に金融・M&A・食品に知見がある、岡村取締役、藤 田内取締役を選任	井取締役、
	b.取締役会は、そのうち過半数が独立社外取締役で構成され、高い監督機能と透明性を兼ね備えた体制	
	①株主提案の候補者のスキルセットや資質・経験等を踏まえ、Paul J. Brough氏を追加で取締役とすべき いこと	とは考えられな
_	a. Paul J. Brough氏は、「財務会計」をコアスキルとしているが、当社推薦の複数の取締役候補者とスキ している	ルセットが重複
	b. Paul J. Brough氏は、主要株主・筆頭株主である、3D社のアドバイザーに就任している。 Paul J. Brough氏と指名委員との間で面談を実施したところ、投資家へのIR活動などを担い、3D社か いるとのことであり、当社知道性基準では「評社立」となると判断。	ら報酬を得て
L	Paul J. Brough氏と指名委員との間で面談を実施したところ、 投資家へのIR活動などを担い、3D社か	ら報酬を得

b. Mr. Paul J. Brough currently serves as an **advisor to 3D**, the company's major and largest shareholder

In a meeting between Mr. Paul J. Brough and the Nomination Committee, he stated that he is engaged in IR activities for investors and receives compensation from 3D. Based on the company's independence criteria, he has been deemed "nonindependent"

Issues

- Our Observations
 - 3D is not Sapporo's parent company and therefore does **not violate any of the Tokyo Stock Exchange's independence standards**
 - Mr. Paul Brough does not have an executive role at 3D and is not involved in our operations, including investor relationship management, and clearly does not fall under the definition of a key shareholder's business executor. Therefore, he does not violate Sapporo's own independence standards
 - If Mr. Paul Brough were to assume the position of director, his advisory contract with 3D would be immediately terminated, and restrictions would be placed on the exchange of information
- Sapporo's Response
 - Based on the misunderstanding that Mr. Paul Brough engages in IR activities for investors of 3D, they claim he is not independent
- Our View
 - Mr. Paul Brough has <u>not</u> engaged in IR activities for 3D's investors; Sapporo's initial response to our shareholder proposal seems to recognize this fact, but the Company has since arbitrarily adjusted its disclosure to distort Mr. Brough's role (see next page 1)
 - 3D has consistently stated that Mr. Paul Brough intends to terminate his advisory contract upon his appointment as a director. Nevertheless, Sapporo has omitted this fact from its recent disclosure (see next page 2)

Sapporo's Materials (February 17, 2025) As confirmed in an interview with him [Mr. Brough] by theNominations Committee, he [Mr. Brough] has been serving as an advisor to the proposing shareholder since February 2024 and has been receiving compensation from

the proposing share 2 · (he has stated that he will resign from this position upon assuming office as an outside director). He is also primarily responsible for investor relations activities, including dialogue with the proposing shareholder's investors, a 1 considered to be performing duties equivalent to those of an executive officer of the proposing shareholder. In light of these circumstances, the Company has decided that, from the perspective of

* The red and blue highlight added by 3D.

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)

④株主提案の候補者のスキルセットや資質・経験等を踏まえ、Paul J. Brough氏を追加で取締役とすべきとは考えられないこと
 a. Paul J. Brough氏は、「財務会計」をコアスキルとしているが、当社推薦の複数の取締役候補者とスキルセットが重複している
 b. Paul J. Brough氏は、主要株主・筆頭株主である、3D社のアドバイザーに就任している。
 Paul J. Brough氏と指名委員との間で面談を実施したと
 投資家へのIR活動などを担い、3D社から報酬を得ているとのことであり、当社独立性基準では「非独立」となると判断。

* The red highlight added by 3D.

4) Considering the Skill Set, Qualifications, and Experience of the Shareholder Proposal Candidate, Mr. Paul J. Brough Should Not Be Additionally Appointed as a Director

- a. Mr. Paul J. Brough's core skill is "financial accounting", but his skill set overlaps with multiple director candidates recommended by the company
- b. Mr. Paul J. Brough currently serves as an advisor to 3D, the company's major and largest shareholder In a meeting between Mr. Paul J. Brough and the Nomination Committee, he stat 1 that he is engaged in IR activities for investors and receives compensation from 3D. Based on the company's independence criteria, he has been deemed "non-independent"

- In its February 17 disclosure materials, Sapporo stated that Mr. Brough is "considered to be performing duties equivalent to those of an executive officer of the proposing shareholder." In its February 28 disclosure materials, the Company, without justification, exaggerated Mr. Brough's role, stating that he is "engaged in IR activities for investors and receives compensation from 3D"
- ² The statement that Mr. Paul Brough "will resign from this position upon assuming office as an outside director," which was included in Sapporo's February 17 disclosure materials, has been removed in the Company's February 28 disclosure materials

Observations on Sapporo's Response to 3D's Public Inquiry

3D sent a public letter to Sapporo urging the Company to answer critical questions regarding the root causes of the impairment loss recorded on the multiple acquisition and issues related to capital discipline

Our Materials (February 25, 2025)

To ensure that shareholders can exercise their voting rights with sufficient information at the 101st Shareholders Meeting, 3D sent a public letter to Sapporo on February 18, 2025, requesting a public response by February 28



Proceeds

February 18, 2025 04:00 AM Eastern Standard Time

February 18, 2025		
apporo Holdings Limited		
20-1 Ebisu, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo ttn: Board of Directors		
c: Board of Directors		_
1 Temasek Avenue		
#20-02A Millenia Tower, Singapore		
3D Investment Partners Pte. Ltd.		
ear Board of Directors,	sestions	
e write to express our continued frustration and concern with the Board's lack of a timely and		
betantive response to our inquiries regarding the root causes of the Company's acquisition		
ilures and lack of capital discipline.	stage of the Stone Brewing ("Stone") acquisition ation, approval, execution, and integration) to	
s we have repeatedly pointed out, Sapporo's consistent suboptimal allocation of capital has resulted	s likelihood of success?	rvisory Committee conduct when approving the
impairment losses on all of the Company's overseas alcoholic beverage acquisitions. Unless Sapporo	the U.S. craft beer market was already in decline,	splain the results of the accounting audit related
entifies the root causes of its past acquisition failures, establishes a proper oversight framework,	uisition of the U.S. craft beer company Anchor please explain, using quantitative data, the basis	ittee evaluate Stone's past and future business
of implements strict capital discipline, we fear that the Company will continue to misallocate capital, ading to further, and possibly irreversible, destruction of corporate value.	please explain, using quantitative data, the basis puiring Stone would contribute to corporate value	the Committee verify the appropriateness of the
acting to nurther, and possibly irreversitize, destruction of corporate value.		? Additionally, did the Committee identify any
one of Sappors's largest investors, we believe we have a responsibility to work on behalf of other	aed unprofitability at the time of the acquisition,	moerns during the evaluation process? When and
archolders, with whom our interests are aligned, to ensure that the Board properly addresses this	p book ratio of approximately 3.4 times ¹ . How did	rment risk? illion yen real estate divestiture and capital
itical issue of capital discipline.	additionally, please describe the company's post- imeline, and the reasons why this plan ultimately	the Audit & Supervisory Committee implement
cordingly, we initially shared in our letter dated February 6, 2025 (the "February 6 Letter") a list	income, and the reasons why this plan ultimately	failures?
questions aimed at understanding the root causes of the failed investment in Stone Brewing	igence was conducted on the Stone acquisition,	Supervisory Committee, specializes in corporate
Stone") and the Company's lack of capital discipline. The Board has refused to answer those	would not be repeated. However, in January 2025,	and DX/IT. Given these limited areas of expertise, ifficient expertise, appropriate leadership, and a
sections. The Board also failed to substantively address the requests outlined in our letter dated	PY 13.9 billion related to the acquisition. What at this impairment loss?	afficient expertise, appropriate leadership, and a alfill its oversight duties and reduce future losses
hruary 14, 2025 (the "February 14 Letter"). Then, on February 17, 2025, Sapporo published the lotice Regarding the Board of Directors' Opinion on Shareholder Proposals," in which it formally	all of its overseas acquisitions, including Sloeman	the Committee believes this to be the case.
goard our proposals to enhance the composition of the Board at the Company's 101st Annual	ng, and Stone. Given these past failures, why was	an of the Audit & Supervisory Committee? Mr.
meral Meeting of Shareholders (the "AGM").	e Stone acquisition? Furthermore, compared to nal measures did the Board implement in the	 positions at Sappore Breweries during past failed e failed deals, he bears significant responsibility.
The Research of the standard s	nal measures did the Board implement in the pe acquisition? Why did these additional measures	tee requires a high degree of independence, and
ith Sapporo planning to divert a substantial portion of its real estate assets and realize hundreds billions of yen in proceeds in the near future, establishing strict capital discipline and formulating		tee Chair. How does the Committee assess Mr.
appropriate capital allocation policy is more critical than ever. However, we believe the current	on every overseas M&A deal. What are the root	
and, particularly the Audit & Supervisory Committee members, lacks the pressnary emertise to	ectives of human resources, expertise, strategy, prective actions should be taken to prevent future	r the Audit & Supervisory Committee Chair d level of independence and expertise for the
aximize the sale price of Sapporo's real estate assets and appropriately reinvest the proceeds. We lieve that many other shareholders share these concerns.	Sourd plan to address these issues? Additionally,	a the required level of independence and expertise
	oard implemented based on past capital allocation	
cordingly, we are today making our concerns public and sharing our questions for the Board with	and a second state of the	ppriateness of decisions related to the maximum are and the allocation of the proceeds. Audit &
her shareholders. All shareholders have a legitimate interest in receiving answers to these	ement accountable for failed acquisitions? Are any ures? What actions has Support taken regarding	are and the allocation of the proceeds, Audit & e high independence and expertise in real estate,
sections ahead of the AGM so that they have sufficient information to make informed voting xisions and, if necessary, hold the Board accountable for its failures of oversight and capital	e for these losses? Furthermore, what additional	w does the Committee plan to address the current
scipline.	prevent repeated acquisition failures and capital	ts members?
	will be available from the planned real estate	Audit & Supervisory Committee will effectively he Board from repeating past capital allocation
e therefore request that Support publicly respond to the attached questions by February 28, 2025,	will be available from the planned real estate ise its M&A evaluation process, capital allocation	ne source from repeating pass capital allocation
e look forward to continuing to engage with you on these critical matters.	in charge of these areas?	
	Board will establish strict capital discipline and	
neorely,	ation failures?	
	nittee	
	ommittee play in the Stone acquisition process?	
	ucted by the Committee in connection with this	
	t at the time of the acquisition fail to prevent the	1
1 The company disclosed in its 99th Securities B	leport that the acquisition price for 100% of Stone's	1
shares was approximately USD 180 million. Add	litionally, in the announcement dated June 24, 2022, the	1
company disclosed that Stone's consolidated net million. Thus, the price to book ratio is estimate	assets as of the end of December 2021 were USD 53 d to be approximately 3 dx	
million. Thus, the perce to book ratio is estimate		
	2	1
	-	
		3

Sapporo published its response to the public inquiry in a document dated February 28, 2025

Sapporo's Materials (February 28, 2025)

(別紙) SAPPORO	
株主提案に対する当社取締役会意見並びに当社ガバナンス体制に関する補足説明 (及び株主の質問状に対する当社見解) Board of Directors' Opinion on Shareholder Proposals and Supplementary Explanation Regarding Our Governance Structure (and Our View on Shareholders's Questions)	4. 株主の質問状に対する当社見解 4. Sapporo's View on Shareholder Questions
	※文中に記載の【取締役会への質問】【監査等委員会への質問】の各番号は、3D社が公表した質 問の番号に該当いたします。
2025年2月28日 URL <u>https://www.sapporoholdings.jp</u>	
Copyright, 2025 SAPPORO HOLDINGS LTD. All rights reserved.	Copyright, 2025 SAPPORD HOLDINGS LTD. All rights reserved. 23
* The text within the square brackets added by 3D.	* The text within the square brackets added by 3D.

However, we believe that these responses do not align with the intent of our inquiries, which is to clarify the fundamental causes of this series of problems and identify where responsibility lies

Source: February 28, 2025「株主提案に対する当社取締役会意見並びに当社ガバナンス体制に関する補足説明(及び株主の質問状に対する当社見解)」 Note: 3D understand that no English version of the materials has been disclosed as of March 4th, 2025 We kindly request that shareholders exercise the voting rights after engaging in dialogue with Sapporo and obtaining sufficient responses to these questions (1/6)

#	Question to the Sapporo Board of Directors	Purpose of the Question
1	 What measures did the Board take at each stage of the Stone Brewing ("Stone") acquisition process (identification, evaluation, negotiation, approval, execution, and integration) to minimize potential losses and maximize the likelihood of success? 	 The question aims to confirm how risks were identified at each stage of the Stone acquisition process (identification, evaluation, negotiation, approval, execution, and integration) and what measures were taken to address the identified risks.
2	 At the time of the 2022 acquisition of Stone, the U.S. craft beer market was already in decline, and the failure of Sapporo's previous acquisition of the U.S. craft beer company Anchor Brewing was evident. Given this situation, please explain, using quantitative data, the basis on which the Board was convinced that acquiring Stone would contribute to corporate value enhancement. 	 The question asks for a quantitative explanation of the basis on which the Board was convinced that the acquisition of Stone would contribute to corporate value enhancement, despite the fact that, at the time of acquisition of Stone, market trends and past track records already indicated significant risks associated with acquiring Stone.
3	 Despite Stone's declining sales and continued unprofitability at the time of the acquisition, Sapporo acquired the company at a price-to-book ratio of approximately 3.4 times. How did the Board justify this acquisition price? Additionally, please describe the company's post-acquisition profitability plan, its projected timeline, and the reasons why this plan ultimately failed. 	 The question seeks to understand how the acquisition price of Stone—at approximately 3.4 times its price-to-book ratio—was justified despite the recognized reasonable risks at the time of acquisition. Additionally, it asks for details on the post-acquisition profitability plan, its projected timeline, and the reasons why the plan failed.
4	 The Board insisted that thorough due diligence was conducted on the Stone acquisition, synergies were identified, and past failures would not be repeated. However, in January 2025, Sapporo recorded an impairment loss of JPY 13.9 billion related to the acquisition. What specific actions did the Board take to prevent this impairment loss? 	 The question seeks to confirm the specific measures the Board took to prevent impairment losses resulting from the acquisition of Stone.

We kindly request that shareholders exercise the voting rights after engaging in dialogue with Sapporo and obtaining sufficient responses to these questions (2/6)

Our Materials (February 25, 2025)

Question to the Sapporo Board of Directors Sapporo has recorded impairment losses on all of its overseas 5 acquisitions, including Sleeman Breweries, Sapporo Vietnam, Anchor Brewing, and Stone. Given these past failures, why was the Board confident in the success of the Stone acquisition? Furthermore, compared to previous failed acquisitions, what additional measures did the Board implement in the evaluation and execution process of the Stone acquisition? Why did these additional measures fail to produce effective results? effective results. 6 Sapporo has incurred impairment losses on every overseas M&A deal.

- What are the root causes of these failures? From the perspectives of human resources, expertise, strategy, process, and oversight mechanisms, what corrective actions should be taken to prevent future capital allocation failures? How does the Board plan to address these issues? Additionally, what specific preventive measures has the Board implemented based on past capital allocation failures?
- Has the Board held any members of management accountable for failed acquisitions? Are any current directors responsible for these failures? What actions has Sapporo taken regarding the management and divisions responsible for these losses? Furthermore, what additional measures does the Board plan to take to prevent repeated acquisition failures and capital allocation missteps?

Purpose of the Question

- The question is based on suspicions that the acquisition was carried out without learning from past failures. It seeks to confirm the differences between past failures and the acquisition of Stone by asking: (1)The reasons why the Board was confident in the success of the Stone acquisition despite past failures. (2)Additional measures the Board implemented in the evaluation and execution process of the Stone acquisition, based on lessons learned from past failures. (3)The reasons why these additional measures failed to produce
- The question is regarding the fact that impairment losses have been recorded in all overseas M&A cases. It seeks to confirm: (1)The root causes of the impairment losses recorded in all overseas M&A cases. (2)Based on this, what corrective actions should be taken to prevent future capital allocation failures. (3)The Board's plan to address these issues. (4)The specific preventive measures the Board has implemented based on past capital allocation failures.
- The question is to confirm whether there has been any pursuit of accountability towards the management regarding previous failed acquisitions.

We kindly request that shareholders exercise the voting rights after engaging in dialogue with Sapporo and obtaining sufficient responses to these questions (3/6)

#	Question to the Sapporo Board of Directors	Purpose of the Question
8	 Given the large amount of capital that will be available from the planned real estate divestiture, how does Sapporo intend to revise its M&A evaluation process, capital allocation decision-making framework, and personnel in charge of these areas? 	 The question is to confirm whether the decision-making regarding the reallocation of the large amount of capital that will be available from the planned real estate divestiture will be appropriately made, by inquiring about the M&A evaluation process, the capital allocation decision-making framework, and any planned changes to the personnel in charge of these areas.
9	 How can shareholders be assured that the Board will establish strict capital discipline and prevent the recurrence of past capital allocation failures? 	 The question is intended to confirm whether there are circumstances that would assure shareholders that the Board will establish strict capital discipline and prevent the recurrence of past capital allocation failures.

We kindly request that shareholders exercise the voting rights after engaging in dialogue with Sapporo and obtaining sufficient responses to these questions (4/6)

#	Question to Sapporo's Audit and Supervisory Committee	Purpose of the Question
1	 What role did the Audit and Supervisory Committee play in the Stone acquisition process? Please describe the specific activities conducted by the Committee in connection with this acquisition. Furthermore, why did the audit at the time of the acquisition fail to prevent the impairment loss recorded after the acquisition? 	 The question asks for an explanation of the Audit and Supervisory Committee's role and specific activities in relation to the Stone acquisition, given that the acquisition has led to impairment losses. It seeks clarification on whether the audit at the time of the acquisition was insufficient and, if it functioned adequately, the reasons why it was unable to prevent the recognition of impairment losses.
2	 What due diligence did the Audit and Supervisory Committee conduct when approving the acquisition of Stone? In particular, please explain the results of the accounting audit related to intangible fixed assets and goodwill. 	 The question aims to confirm whether the Audit and Supervisory Committee conducted sufficient due diligence when approving the acquisition of Stone, given that the acquisition was made at approximately 3.4 times the price-to- book ratio (PBR). Specifically, it seeks to understand how the committee evaluatated the accounting audit results related to intangible fixed assets and goodwill.
3	 How did the Audit and Supervisory Committee evaluate Stone's past and future business performance and corporate value? How did the Committee verify the appropriateness of the acquisition price determined by the Board? Additionally, did the Committee identify any discrepancies, impairment risks, or other concerns during the evaluation process? When and how did the Committee recognize the impairment risk? 	 The question aims to determine whether the Audit and Supervisory Committee effectively functioned in the acquisition of Stone, specifically assessing whether the appropriateness audit was properly conducted given that the acquisition ultimately resulted in an impairment loss.

We kindly request that shareholders exercise the voting rights after engaging in dialogue with Sapporo and obtaining sufficient responses to these questions (5/6)

#	Question to Sapporo's Audit and Supervisory Committee	Purpose of the Question
4	 In light of Sapporo's upcoming multi-billion-yen real estate divestiture and capital reallocation, what additional measures will the Audit and Supervisory Committee implement to ensure proper oversight, considering past failures? 	 The question seeks to confirm the specific additional measures that the Audit and Supervisory Committee plans to implement to ensure that the same mistakes are not repeated in the ongoing real estate divestment process, based on lessons learned from past failures.
5	 Toru Miyaishi, the Chairman of the Audit and Supervisory Committee, specializes in corporate management, human resources, marketing, and DX/IT. Given these limited areas of expertise, does the Committee believe it possesses sufficient expertise, appropriate leadership, and a well- structured organization to effectively fulfill its oversight duties and reduce future losses and impairment risks? Please explain why the Committee believes this to be the case. 	 The question aims to determine Director Miyaishi's suitability as the Audit and Supervisory Committee Chairperson, given that the Chair's qualifications significantly impact the effectiveness of the committee's auditing function. Specifically, it seeks to understand how the Audit and Supervisory Committee evaluates Director Miyaishi's qualifications for the role.
6	 Why was Mr. Miyaishi selected as Chairman of the Audit and Supervisory Committee? Mr. Miyaishi is an internal director who held key positions at Sapporo Breweries during past failed acquisitions. Given his involvement in these failed deals, he bears significant responsibility. Typically, the Audit and Supervisory Committee requires a high degree of independence, and the same principle applies to the Committee Chair. How does the Committee assess Mr. Miyaishi's lack of independence? 	 The question aims to confirm the reason for appointing Director Miyaishi as the Audit and Supervisory Committee Chairperson, despite his involvement in past failed cases, given that a high degree of independence is particularly required for this position. Additionally, it seeks to clarify the assessment of his lack of independence—or, if the Audit and Supervisory Committee considers him independent, the rational basis for such an evaluation.

We kindly request that shareholders exercise the voting rights after engaging in dialogue with Sapporo and obtaining sufficient responses to these questions (6/6)

#	Question to Sapporo's Audit and Supervisory Committee	Purpose of the Question
7	Is the selection process and criteria for the Audit and Supervisory Committee Chair appropriate? What should be the required level of independence and expertise for the Committee Chair? Similarly, what should be the required level of independence and expertise for Committee members?	 The question seeks to confirm the level of independence and expertise required for the Audit and Supervisory Committee Chairperson and members, given that the Chairperson's suitability has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the committee's auditing function.
8	 To properly audit the legitimacy and appropriateness of decisions related to the maximum price realization of the real estate divestiture and the allocation of the proceeds, Audit and Supervisory Committee members must have high independence and expertise in real estate, asset sales, M&A, and capital allocation. How does the Committee plan to address the current lack of independence and expertise within its members? 	 The question seeks to confirm how the Audit and Supervisory Committee plans to compensate for its lack of independence and expertise to properly conduct appropriateness audits on the divestiture of real estate at the highest possible price and the proper reallocation of the substantial proceeds gained.
9	 How can shareholders be assured that the Audit and Supervisory Committee will effectively fulfill its oversight function and prevent the Board from repeating past capital allocation failures? 	 The question aims to confirm whether there are clear and convincing measures that assure shareholders that the Audit and Supervisory Committee will effectively perform its audit function, based on reflections on past capital allocation failures.

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